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Inside processes:
Transitory understandings, action guiding 
anticipations, and withness thinking
*
John Shotter
To talk and to think, not about process, but in relation to it, is not easy. 
Many brilliant writers and thinkers in the recent past have helped us to 
think about process from the outside, about processes that we merely ob-
serve as happening ‘over there’, but few have helped us to think in terms 
of our own, spontaneously responsive involvement in ongoing processes 
from the inside. Yet practitioners need a style of thought and talk that al-
lows them uniquely to affect the flow of processes from within their own 
unique living involvements with them. Crucially, I will argue, this kind of 
responsive action and understanding only becomes available to us in our 
relations with living forms if we enter into dialogically-structured rela-
tions with them. It remains utterly unavailable to us as external observers. 
I will call this kind of thinking, thinking-from-within or “withness-
thinking,” to contrast it with the “aboutness-thinking” that is more familiar 
to us. In articulating its nature, I will draw on the work of Bakhtin and 
Wittgenstein, along with Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Polanyi. Central 
to it and quite unavailable to us in aboutness-thinking, is our subsidiary 
awareness (Polanyi, 1958) of certain “action guiding anticipations” and 
“transitory understandings” that become available to us within any ongo-
ing processes in which we happen to be engaged, such that we can always 
have an anticipatory sense of at least the style or the grammar of what next 
might occur. 
*  This paper is based on the spoken paper for keynote address at the first Organization
Studies Summer Workshop: on Theorizing Process in Organizational Research, 
Santorini, June 12-13th, 2005. 
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“Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things, we place 
ourselves outside them in order to recompose their becoming artificially. 
We take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are 
characteristic of the reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, 
abstract, uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of 
knowledge, in order to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this 
becoming itself...Whether we would think becoming, or express it, or even 
perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set going a kind of cinemato-
graph inside us” (Bergson 1911, 322-323). 
“It seems then that, parallel to this physics, a second kind of knowledge 
ought to have grown up, which could have retained what physics allowed 
to escape... This second kind of knowledge would have set the cine-
matographical method aside. It would have called upon the mind to re-
nounce its most cherished habits... it is the flow of time, it is the very flux 
of the real that we should be trying to follow ... by accustoming [the mind] 
to install itself within the moving, but by developing also another faculty, 
complementary to the intellect, we may open a perspective on the other 
half of the real... a life of the real” (Bergson 1911, 343-344). 
Currently, there is much discussion of the concept of process (Chia 2002, 
2003; Chia/Tsoukas 2002, 2003). Indeed, “Theorizing Process in Organiza-
tional Research” was the focal topic in a recent European Organization Stud-
ies Summer Workshop
1
. There was, however, an important caveat in the 
original call for papers for that Workshop: all the offered attempts to theorize 
process should keep in mind the aim of rethinking appropriate styles of em-
pirical research. On the face of it, from a rational point of view, this would 
seem to be both a highly desirable aim as well as a quite unexceptional one. 
What else could possibly be one’s goal in organizational research? Prior to 
our inquiries into a something, we need to know what that something is, and 
1  The theme of the First Organization Studies Summer Workshop was “On Theorizing 
Process in Organizational Research,” 12th-13th June 2005, in Santorini, Greece. 
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surely, that is best accomplished by the systematic formulation of an explana-
tory theory as to its nature. 
Losing the phenomena 
Below, however, I want to discuss some major difficulties with the adoption 
of this approach in this instance, when we are concerned with processes 
within which we ourselves are, or at least can be, embedded as practitioners. 
For, as I see it, as (action) researchers, as co-practitioners along with those 
with whom we are conducting our inquiries, our task is to develop styles of 
thought and talk that allow those primarily involved in the particular proc-
esses in question, to uniquely affect the flow of those processes from within 
their own unique living involvements with them. Thus, to pose the difficulty 
we face as that of theorizing process in relation to empirical inquiry, may be 
wholly misleading: it can lead us into beginning our inquiries with a quite in-
appropriate orientation toward our own overall aims. For, if as action re-
searchers we are interested in adopting a more collaborative or participatory 
approach in our inquiries, it can lead us instead to seek our own wilful, ma-
nipulative, and individualistic control over the processes in question – for 
this, after all, is the practical aim of scientific investigations (see Shotter 
1999). But more than this, it can mislead us in our inquiries to arriving on the 
scene too late and to looking in the wrong direction with the wrong attitude in 
mind: too late, because we take the ‘basic elements’ in terms of which we 
must work and conduct our arguments to be already fixed in existence;  in the 
wrong direction, because we look backward toward supposed already exist-
ing actualities, rather than forward toward possibilities; and with the wrong 
attitude, because we seek a static picture, a theoretical representation, of a 
phenomenon, rather than a living sense of it as an active agency in our lives. 
In short, in Garfinkel’s (2002, 264-267) terms, we “lose the phenomena.” 
We lose the phenomena because mainstream theory-driven research por-
trays practitioners as people who simply choose and reflect (or reflect and 
choose) in the performance of their actions. It fails to portray them as partici-
pants already caught up in a ceaselessly ongoing process who – in the face of 
the constraints and limited resources it affords them, as well as the responses 
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it ‘calls for’ from them – must produce from within that ongoing process, 
both recognizable and accountable utterances and actions, recognizable 
sounds and movements. In moving on inside a world that is making them 
whilst they are making it, they are not able to reflect on that world as a fin-
ished object: they know what they are doing, i.e., they can account for it to 
others if challenged; they know why they are doing it, i.e., they have a reason 
for it; but what they still don’t yet know, is what their doing has done – it 
may in the end all turn out badly. An overall evaluation of the outcome of 
their actions is possible only on their final completion (whenever that may 
be). Theory-driven research, however, approaches the process of people act-
ing as a sequence of already completed actions, and reflects back on them 
with the aim of mastering their rational reproduction. In so doing, their se-
quential unfolding is represented as a sequence of static, well-defined, al-
ready existing states or positions, occurring juxtaposed with each other like 
beads on a string (with time being seen as a fourth dimension of space). It 
fails to account for the myriad situated details to which an actor must attend 
and respond in their struggles to creatively produce their actions in the first 
place – and I will use the word ‘struggle’ from now on to indicate the over-
coming of a unique difficulty for a first-time. 
Cunliffe (1997) reports the comments of Steve, the Vice-President of a 
New England power company in America, when being interviewed about the 
multidimensional complexities and uncertainties of his job: 
Steve: “The worst part of my job is that every decision I make is 20-20 
hindsighted by everybody: by the Utilities Commission and by my super-
visors. December of ‘89 was my worst nightmare. We began on Thanks-
giving day with 40 consecutive days of the coldest temperature ever re-
corded. We were having a new pipeline installed that was scheduled to be 
completed November 1st – with the new supply coming in – it didn’t get 
completed until December 18th. I had planned to go out and use other sup-
ply that was running through. Our propane supply ship coming into XXX 
[our dock here] got hit with a hundred foot sea on December 22nd – was 
scheduled to be in on the 25th coming over from Algeria. It took a huge 
crack in the bow and two people got killed. I didn’t anticipate that. Then 
by December 22nd I was a certifiable genius – I was the only one in a six 
State Region with any propane left. I got a call at home from Governor 
YYY at 8:30 at night to tell me I’d be in his office at 9:00 the next morn-
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ing. I was either going to give him 100,000 gallons of my propane or he 
was going to take 500,000 gallons – ‘Have a nice night! See you in the 
morning!’ We had to call the Attorneys, I was up all night: ‘Could he do 
that’? – ‘Yes’.  ...  Then it was the warmest January ever recorded, the 
warmest February ever recorded .... then we went from not enough to too 
much. I sat on the witness stand (at the Utilities Commission who wanted 
to disallow $1,000,000 from the Company) for twenty two and a half days 
explaining every decision I made.” 
Here, then, in dealing with the kind of circumstances Steve describes, there is 
nothing comparable to the solution of a logical or mathematical problem, in 
which we have to cudgel our brains to devise ways of working out something 
unknown from what we already know about the situation in question. Prob-
lems of that kind can be solved by ‘calculation’ because they are already well 
defined as such. “Problem solving” of this kind entails the application of 
what Schön (1983) calls a “technical rationality.” But, as Steve’s case makes 
clear, involved as an aspect of people’s struggles to creatively produce their 
actions in the first place, is what Schön (1983) calls “problem-setting,” which 
is: “the process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be 
achieved, the means which may be chosen... Problem-setting is a process in 
which, interactively, we name the things to which we will attend and frame
the context in which we will attend to them” (40). It is in situations of prac-
tice that “problem setting” becomes so crucially important, because, as Schön 
pointed out, “the situations of practice are not problems to be solved but 
problematic situations characterized by uncertainty, disorder, and indetermi-
nacy” (15-16). In other words, as we pointed out above, what we face in prac-
tice is not a problem presenting itself as something already well-defined in 
relation to the kind of technical ingenuity required for their solution, but a 
situation in which a struggle to realize an effective outcome in the face of of-
ten unpropitious circumstances is required. We call it a struggle rather than 
problem-solving because, as we have seen, in expressing each sequential 
movement in an ongoing course of action, we have to struggle with, i.e., 
navigate within, an often overwhelming sea of unique details, and to take all 
of these somehow into account in the unique course of action we actually 
take. As Bakhtin (1993) puts it: “The performed act concentrates, correlates, 
and resolves within a unitary and unique and, this time, final context both the 
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sense and the fact, the universal and the individual, the real and the ideal, for 
everything enters into the composition of its answerable motivation. The per-
formed act constitutes a going out once and for all from within possibility as 
such into what is once-occurrent” (28-29). We just do in the circumstances 
what, given all our accumulated experience, seems to be for the best at that 
moment – as Steve remarks, “the worst part of my job is that every decision I 
make is 20-20 hindsighted by everybody...”  
Wittgenstein (1953) captures the ease with which we can mislead our-
selves into adopting such inappropriate ways of thinking about and looking at 
the phenomena around us, and within us, in our inquiries – so that a first-time 
creative process gets respecified as a second-time rational decision making
process – in the following remark: “How does the philosophical problem 
about mental processes and states... arise.? – The first step is the one that al-
together escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them – we think. 
But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter.
For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process 
better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it 
was the very one that we thought quite innocent.) – And now the analogy 
which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to 
deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And 
now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t 
want to deny them” (no. 308, my emphasis). 
So, if we want to “attach ourselves to the inner becoming of things,” as 
Bergson (1911, 322) suggests we should, if we want to gain a more direct ap-
prehension of the passing reality within which we have and live our lives, 
what can we do? As I see it, there is an important distinction to be made be-
tween what, loosely, we might call the relation of useful conversational talk
to the conduct and development of organizational processes, and the attempt 
to formulate rigorous (scientific) theories appropriate to these tasks. Indeed, I 
want to go so far as to argue for the inappropriateness of strict, systematic 
theories and special terminology in attempts to understand and to produce 
change in organizations, and for the appropriateness of everyday conversa-
tional talk (Shotter/Cunliffe 2002). For, as I see it, such theoretical talk works 
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to un-relate us to the very events occurring around us that – if we were to re-
relate ourselves appropriately to them – could in fact provide us with the “ac-
tion guiding” sensibility we require if we are to ‘go on’ to respond to such 
events appropriately. But clearly, for everyday conversational talk to be use-
ful in this way, it must be related in certain crucial ways to the processes 
within which it can exert its influence. It is the nature of these special rela-
tions, and how they have in fact been already illuminated by a whole galaxy 
of concerned writers, that I want to explore further below. 
Talk that can influence our ‘ways of seeing’ 
Whilst there are quite a number of writers oriented toward helping us think 
about the inner movements occurring in processes “from the outside,” so to 
speak, that is, about the inner movements occurring in processes that we can 
observe as happening over there – and here I have in mind the brilliant work 
of such writers and thinkers in the recent past as William James, Henri Berg-
son, and Gregory Bateson among many others – there is another set of writers 
who, I think, can more immediately help us in gaining an understanding 
“from within” those processes in which we are, or can be, involved, and 
which, because of our involvement, we can affect. And here I have in mind, 
and will be drawing on the work of such writers as Bakhtin and Wittgenstein, 
along with Vygotsky, Merleau-Ponty, and Polanyi.  
They can, I think, be of a more immediate help to us, because they have 
realized that there are other ways of seeing, understanding, thinking, and act-
ing that become available to us in our relations with living forms, if we can 
enter into responsive,  dynamic or dialogical relations with them – a rela-
tional-responsive way of understanding that is quite different in kind from the 
referential-representational form we are used to in our more intellectual 
dealings with our surroundings. Elsewhere (Shotter 1993a, 1993b), I have 
called this kind of understanding and thinking, an understanding-from-within, 
but here I will call it simply, withness-thinking. It is a kind of momentary 
knowledge that one can only have from within one’s active, ongoing relations 
with the others and othernesses in one’s surroundings, and which disappears 
as soon as one’s active involvements with them cease. 
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In Polanyi’s (1958) terms, in withness-thinking, we might say that instead 
of thinking with a focal awareness of the end point of a process in mind, we 
think along with a subsidiary awareness of certain felt experiences as they 
occur to us from within our engaged (or responsive) involvement in a particu-
lar unfolding process, and that these responsive inner feelings play a crucial 
role in guiding our actions – or, as I will put it from now on, we experience 
ourselves in our engaged or involved activities as being issued with “acting 
guiding calls or advisories.” As is well-known, Polanyi (1958) introduced his 
notion of “tacit knowledge” as exerting an action guiding function thus: 
“When we use a hammer to drive a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, 
but in a different way... When we bring down the hammer we do not feel that 
its handle has struck our palm but that its head has struck the nail. Yet in a 
sense we are certainly alert to the feelings in our palm and the fingers that 
hold the hammer. They guide us in handling it effectively, and the degree of 
attention that we give to the nail is given to the same extent but in a different 
way to these feelings... They are not watched in themselves: we watch some-
thing else while keeping intensely aware of them. I have a subsidiary aware-
ness of the feeling in the palm of my hand which is merged into my focal
awareness of my driving in the nail” (55). To repeat, the feelings of which 
we are subsidiarily aware in our palm and fingers are required to guide us in 
our handling of the hammer effectively; it is impossible to hammer skillfully 
with anaesthetized hands. 
But let me also note, it is only those of us who have had a great deal of 
hammering experience – my own early background was in carpentry and en-
gineering – who will find Polanyi’s written account capable of re-arousing 
such feelings in them, capable of reminding them of the nature and role of 
such subsidiary awarenesses. I make this comment here, as later I want to 
discuss the relevance of Wittgenstein’s (1953) use of an everyday, conversa-
tional kind of language to remind
2
 us of things that are “already in plain 
view” (no. 89) in our interactions with the others and othernesses around us, 
2  “Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are sup-
posed to give an account of it, is something that we need to remind ourselves of. (And 
it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself.)” 
(Wittgenstein, 1953, no. 89).
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things which we already ‘know’ in our practical doings, but which we cannot 
easily give an account of when asked. For, as I indicted above, there is a certain 
kind of conversational talk that can be a powerful help to us in further refining 
and developing our practices, in reflecting back to us at crucial moments, im-
portant aspects of our practices from within our own conduct of them.  
In turning then to events occurring between us, to our everyday use of 
language, which is much more familiar to all of us than (perhaps) hammering 
nails, we find that Bakhtin (1986) nicely captures some aspects of the special 
nature of what I called above withness-knowing, when he suggests that: “All 
real and integral understanding is actively responsive... And the speaker him-
self is oriented precisely toward such an actively responsive understanding. 
He does not expect passive understanding that, so to speak, only duplicates 
his or her own idea in someone else’s mind. Rather, he expects response, 
agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth...” (69). In other 
words, we do not have to wait for speakers to complete their utterances be-
fore we can understand their speech sufficiently to respond to it in practice. 
For present to us in our spontaneous bodily responsiveness to their voicing of 
their utterances as they unfold, are action guiding anticipatory understand-
ings of what they might possibly say next. For again, as Bakhtin (1986) 
notes: “The utterance is related not only to preceding, but also to subsequent 
links in the chain of speech communication... [F]rom the very beginning, the 
utterance is constructed while taking into account possible responsive reac-
tions, for whose sake, in essence, it is actually created... From the very begin-
ning, the speaker expects a response from them, an active responsive under-
standing. The entire utterance is constructed, as it were, in anticipation of en-
countering this response” (94). And all these relationally-responsive, “transi-
tory understandings” happen spontaneously,
3
 as a result no doubt of the 
3  But the utterances in question are all always fashioned in a responsive relation to local 
circumstances, they are not thus merely mechanical repetitions of previous utterances. 
Thus, as Voloshinov (1984) puts it: “The task of understanding does not basically 
amount to recognizing the form used, but rather to understanding it in a particular, 
concrete context, to understanding its meaning in a particular utterance, i.e., it amounts 
to understanding its novelty and not to recognizing its identity” (68). It is not its pre-
cise repeatability that is important but its “specific variability” (69). It is this that al-
lows us to move on from what a speaker’s words mean, to what the speaker means by 
using them.
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countless hours of training we have had in our prior involvements in our cul-
ture.
4
 We do not have to ‘work them out’, self-consciously and deliberately. 
To see the relevance of Bakhtin’s remarks above to the special nature of 
withness-knowing, consider a speaker asking us the following complex ques-
tion: “What crucial features of a dynamic, interactive process are lost in at-
tempting to represent such a process as a sequence of static configurations of 
separate parts joined to each other as a sequence in terms of the laws of mo-
tion of such parts?” In answering any such question, we must continually 
think with the question’s voice in mind to guide us in our attempts to formu-
late (to write out) an answer to it; and of course, as soon as we begin the 
process of producing an answer, we must also think with what we have al-
ready written in mind as well, to guide our further thinking as to what an ap-
propriate answer requires. We repeatedly voice the question to ourselves in 
the hope of it calling new responses from us. It is precisely these unique ac-
tion guiding anticipatory understandings arising out of our acting with a ques-
tion in mind – which arise, in fact, in our voicing the question again to our-
selves in our “inner speech” (Vygotsky 1986) – that are lost when our unique, 
once-off, creative responses to the ‘questions’ posed to us by the others and 
othernesses in our surroundings are refashioned as a wilfully planned de-
contextualized actions. What originally occurred as a unique answer to a 
unique question coming to us from our surroundings, is re-composed into an 
action that can be executed by any isolated individual, anywhere, at anytime. 
But, as I indicated above, if we are to respond appropriately to the unique 
events occurring around us, we need to re-relate ourselves to them in such a 
way that they arouse in us the uniquely appropriate “transitory understand-
ings” (that give us a sense of ‘where we stand’) and “action guiding anticipa-
tions” (that give us a sense of ‘where we might go next’) that can enable us to 
‘go on’ to respond to them appropriately. This may seem to suggest that all 
theoretical writings should now be seen as useless to us a practitioners. But 
this, I think, is not so. It is a matter of how we relate or orient ourselves to-
ward their utterances when they are talking of human communication and 
4  “Human learning presupposes a specific social nature and a process by which children 
grow into the intellectual life of those around them” (Vygotsky 1978, 88). 
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other human practices familiar to us: Instead of attending to what theorists 
are supposedly talking about, what they are attempting to picture or represent 
as an essential state of affairs ‘over there’, by responding to and thinking with
the relationally-responsive meanings of their utterances in mind, as “remind-
ers,” we can perhaps use them as ‘guides’ in helping us judge how best, prac-
tically, to ‘go on’ in relation to the unique events currently occurring around 
us. For it is their utterances in the course of their speaking (when, that is, they 
are speaking of situations with which we are all familiar) that can guide us in 
acting effectively. For, if we can keep their voicing of their utterances in 
mind, like the powerful voices of all the others around us who first instructed 
us in the ways of acting appropriate in our community (Vygotsky 1978, 
1986), they can arouse in us the possible action guiding advisories that can 
give us a sense of how to ‘go on’ in the situations of which they speak in their 
talk.
As an example of what I mean here, we can take Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
remark, to do with how, when someone doesn’t ‘get’ what you are trying to 
teach them, you sometimes simply put another example in front of them: “I 
wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture con-
sists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to 
compare it with this rather than that set of pictures. I have changed his way of 
looking at things. (Indian mathematicians: “Look at this.”)” (no. 144). Look-
ing now with the action guiding awareness aroused in him by the new exam-
ple, he now ‘gets it.’ But we are all familiar with teachers saying to us, while 
watching over our attempts to carry out a skilled practice, “Not like that (re-
peating in exaggerated form our still not quite right attempt), but like this
(executing the act now with emphatic finesse).” Thus to bring to our attention 
the crucial differences between our own attempt to ‘get it’, with what a 
poised or self-possessed ‘getting it’ consists in, where sure a confident ‘get-
ting it’ consists in, as we shall see, a performance that meets a complex mul-
tiplicity of intertwined and not wholly articulable criteria. 
Cunliffe (2001) gives an example of a rather different kind. In discussing 
with another Steve, the Vice-President of a company facing all kinds of 
changes due to government deregulation of the industry, she quotes his com-
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ments on the reluctance of people within the company to deal with these 
changes:
“Steve: Parts of the business aren’t talking about it. The Finance side is... 
it’s almost like Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz, they click their heels and 
they want to go back to Kansas – and you can’t go back. Humpty 
Dumpty’s off the wall – I’m sorry! (Laughter)” 
As Cunliffe comments, this remark not only enabled her to grasp the nature 
of the internal relations in the organization, its irony also gave her a direct 
and clear sense of the Finance department’s attitudes. 
Thus, given these examples, to the question as to whether there is a form 
of inquiry, with associated ways of talking and thinking, that can capture the 
character of such action guiding anticipations, and recreate them when neces-
sary in such a way that they can, so to speak, be ‘carried over’ into new cir-
cumstances different from those in which they were originally created, then I 
think we can answer: there is! Indeed, it will be precisely the inserting, or the 
chiasmic intertwining (see Shotter 2003a), at an appropriate moment of an 
event that arouses an “action guiding subsidiary awareness” at that moment 
in a practice, that can, I think, lead to a correction, a refining, or an elabora-
tion of the practice in question. Thus it is on inserting events of this kind at 
appropriate moments into a practice that we need to focus, I suggest, if we 
are to rethink the styles of empirical research appropriate to our re-visioning 
of organizational processes.
Living expression 
Why have we not been aware of this possibility before? What has prevented 
us from “attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of things” (Bergson 1911, 
322)? In Bergson’s view, it is because we have approached our difficulties as 
intellectual difficulties, and it is “the function of the intellect is to preside 
over actions. Now, in action, it is the result that interests us; the means matter 
little provided the end is attained... and thence it comes also that only the goal 
where our activity will rest is pictured explicitly to our mind: the movements 
constituting the action itself either elude our consciousness or reach it only 
confusedly” (Bergson 1911, 315). In other words, in being concerned with 
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practical affairs, we have thought only in terms of visible objects, identifiable 
positions in space, and sequences of self-contained actions – and this, of 
course, is essentially the “external world” of the intellect as set out in Des-
cartes’s Discours of 1631 (Descartes 1968).  
Elsewhere (Shotter 2003b), I have set out the characteristics of the Carte-
sian world view in detail, so I will not repeat them here. Suffice it here to 
mention two of its central ideas: One is the idea of the universe (and every-
thing in it) as being made up of an aggregate or configuration of independ-
ently existing, unchanging, separate parts, which, at each instant in time, can 
be found to have taken up one or another configuration according to an now 
absent God’s externally imposed laws of motion. The other is the idea that 
inquiries based in this divide and rule approach, will enable us to put the 
things in nature “to all the uses for which they are appropriate, and thereby 
make ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature” (78). And 
clearly, it is a view of the world around us that has enabled us to exploit it ex-
tensively to our own ends. But, as Milic Capek (1961) remarks with regard to 
the classical world view: “When we speak of the classical picture of physical 
reality, we are indicating by the very choice of the word its most significant 
character: its pictorial nature” (3). And it is the action guiding advisories im-
plicit in this Cartesian discourse (Foucault 1969) that is constitutive of the 
current mainstream consensus as to what proper research is.
Indeed, regarding his own difficulties in this respect, Wittgenstein (1953) 
remarks: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay 
in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (no. 115). 
In other words, because the urges and compulsions, the inclinations and 
temptations, the anticipations and expectations are implicit in our ordinary 
everyday talk of practical things, they are extremely difficult to overcome. 
They cannot be “solved” as intellectual problems. As Wittgenstein (1980) 
also notes: “What makes a subject hard to understand – if it’s something sig-
nificant and important – is not that before you can understand it you need to 
be specially trained in abstruse matters, but the contrast between understand-
ing the subject and what most people want to see. Because of this the very 
things which are most obvious may become the hardest of all to understand. 
What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do with the will, rather than 
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with the intellect” (Wittgenstein 1980, 17). So, although we often think that 
our problems can be solved by doing yet more research, an important set of 
problems are not of that kind at all: they are orientational problems, problems 
of the will, to do both with how we relate ourselves to events occurring in 
our surroundings, and with our relations to our own responses to them.  
In other words, it is not because we lack knowledge, data, or information 
that we fail to attach ourselves to the inner becoming of things; it is because 
we approach them with a whole set of inappropriate, taken for granted intel-
lectual expectations and anticipations in mind (of which we are often un-
aware, and remain unaware). As a result, we often ignore something that in 
fact is very obvious to us indeed. We ignore the very special nature of living 
expression
5
, and we fail to understand what it is that makes it very different 
from the mere locomotive movement of things and objects in space, that we 
describe in terms of a collection of independent particles taking up different 
positions in space at different instants in time. Let me make eight points: 
First, rather than simply being re-arrangements or re-configurations of 
separately existing parts, which at each instant in time take up a new configu-
ration (according to pre-existing laws or principles), expressive movements
are the movements of indivisible, dynamic, self-structurizing, unitary, living
wholes, each one utterly unique in and to itself. 
Thus next, besides their moving around in space, living wholes as such 
can also be sensed as moving within themselves. Such expressive movements 
can be sensed as occurring through time, even if the bodies of the relevant 
living beings stay steadfastly fixed in a particular location in space – they 
breath, they make noises, they wave their limbs about, and so on. 
Thirdly, in so doing, they seem to display both short-term expressive ‘in-
ner’ movements – smiles, frowns, gestures, vocalizations, etc. – the expres-
sions of a ‘thou’, i.e., of their own living identity, and more long term ‘inner’ 
movements, i.e., of their aging. Indeed, all such living wholes endure through 
a whole continuous, sequential life process: A process that begins with their 
initial conception (in a two-being interaction); that leads to their birth (as an 
5  The power of Bakhtin’s (1981, 1983, 1984, 1991) work is a testament to our awaken-
ing attention to this sphere of spontaneously responsive activity. 
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individual being); then their growth to maturity (as an autonomous being); 
and then their death.
So fourthly, while dead assemblages can be constructed piece by piece 
from objective parts – that is, from parts that retain their character irrespec-
tive of whether they are a part of the assemblage or not – living, indivisible 
wholes cannot. On the contrary, they grow. And in the course of exchanges 
with their surroundings, they transform themselves, internally, from simple 
individuals into richly structured ones. In this growth, their ‘parts’ are not 
only a constant state of change
6
, but they owe their very existence both to 
their relations to each other and to their relations to themselves at some ear-
lier point in time. Thus the history of their structural transformations in time 
is of more consequence than the logic of their momentary structure(s) in 
space.
Thus fifthly, there is not only a kind of developmental continuity involved 
in the unfolding of all living activities, but all living entities also imply their 
surroundings, so to speak; in their very nature, they come into existence 
ready to grow into their own appropriate environment, or Umwelt (von 
Uexkull 1957). There is thus a distinctive ‘inner dynamic’ to living wholes 
not manifested in dead, mechanical assemblages, such that the earlier phases 
of the activity are indicative of at least the style of what is to come later – we 
can thus respond to their activities in an anticipatory fashion. 
Thus sixthly, in always giving rise to what we might call identity preserv-
ing changes, they and their ‘parts’ are always ‘on the way’ to becoming more 
than they already are. This is why their special, living nature cannot be cap-
tured in a timeless, ‘everything-present-together’, spatial structure or a single 
order of logical connectedness (systematic theories won’t do it!). 
And seventhly, when two or more such forms of life ‘rub together’, so to 
speak, in their meetings, they always create a third or a collective form of life 
a) in which they all sense themselves participating, and b) which has a life of 
its own, with its own ‘voice’ and ‘callings’, and its own way of ‘pointing’ 
toward the future. 
6  Hence the need to put the word ‘parts’ in scare quotes. While, perhaps, analytically 
separable, the ‘parts’ of a living, indivisible whole cannot be substantially separated.  
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And finally, eighthly, the meeting together of two slight different, but not 
too different, forms of life, or processes, has a chiasmic, or complexly inter-
twined quality to it – it is the optic chiasma in binocular vision which creates 
the ‘relational dimension’ of depth; the two slightly different views from the 
two eyes are chiasmically related, i.e., dynamically intertwined (Bateson 
1979; Merleau-Ponty 1968). 
It is no wonder that in commenting on the nature of living movement as a 
continuously flowing process, Bergson (1911) suggested that “... there is 
more in a movement than in the successive positions attributed to the moving 
object, more in a becoming than in the forms passed through in turn, more in 
the evolution of form than the forms assumed one after another. Philosophy 
can therefore derive terms of the second kind from those of the first, but not 
the first from the second: from the first terms [Bergson’s own intuitive form 
of] speculation must take its start. But the intellect reverses the order of the 
two groups; and, on this point, ancient philosophy proceeds as the intellect 
does. It installs itself in the immutable, it posits only Ideas” (333). We can 
now perhaps get a sense of what is lost when we install ourselves in the im-
mutable in order to gain a wholly cognitive/intellectual grasp of the others 
and othernesses in our surroundings in solely in the interest of mastery. 
What is lost in trying to theorize process ‘from the outside’ 
As I have already mentioned, one reason is that I am troubled by the very no-
tion of trying to “theorize” process is that (at least it seems to me) such a term 
carries with it an enormous amount of implicit and unexamined conceptual 
baggage (Shotter 1999). Besides requiring us to address the subject(s) of our 
inquiries as if we ourselves are disembodied, disinterested creatures able to 
adopt a God’s eye view (Haraway 1991) – and to treat our subjects as if they 
were not subjects at all but objects – we also find ourselves committed to 
searching for something radically hidden, for something that can only be ar-
rived at as an “interpretation,” as a “reading,” or as a “representation,” a 
something that has become so utterly unavailable to us just as a result of our 
cutting ourselves off from our access to it ‘in’ the events that are unfolding 
around us (Shotter 2000). In short, “theorizing” leads us into thinking that we 
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control our actions solely through our systematic thoughts, and to cut our-
selves off from the transitory understandings provided to us in being sponta-
neously responsive to the embodied aspects of people’s expressions.
Cunliffe (1997) comments on the persuasive skills managers have to exert 
and on the transitory understandings they make use of in being effective in 
their persuading. Vince, President of a small manufacturing company ex-
plains his approach in trying to get Sales staff to realize that, although com-
mitment to the customer is important, certain margins have to be observed if 
the overall health of the company is to be maintained: 
“Vince: I realize it’s a delicate balance and so we’ve got Sales people 
working closely with operations people.... we had our first Sales meeting 
this year and we brought in all the Sales reps. From across the country ... 
and we made a presentation .... when I was delivering the message – I 
looked for body language and responses because you learn that in interac-
tion with people there are things you can pick up on to sell your ideas to 
them.” 
But, as I have already suggested, we do not understand people’s expressions 
intellectually, in a referential-representational manner; we understand them 
bodily in a relationally-responsive manner. It is a kind of historical or ges-
tural understanding which primarily takes their temporal ‘movement’ into 
account. Rather than an instantaneous ‘getting the picture’, it arouses within 
us an unfolding inner movement that occurs over time, and which – like a 
piece of music – has a unique temporal ‘shape’ or ‘identity’ to it that points 
us toward a future yet to come that has a particular style to it. 
It is our transitory sense of this ‘future indicating shape’ that is lost in our 
adoption of the Cartesian-Cinematographical (C-C), pictorial way of relating 
ourselves to our surroundings (Bergson 1911). For strangely, an important 
aspect of their ‘shape’ that is lost to us, is their open, unfinished nature that 
‘points’ us, so to speak, toward their ‘horizons’. Describing our surroundings 
solely in terms of spatial (or pictorial) configurations (mis)leads us into for-
getting, not only the essential differences between dead assemblages of ex-
ternally related parts, but also the essential difference between, in Bergson’s 
(1911) terms, changes of succession, i.e., the continuous emergence into be-
ing of a living unity, and changes of juxtaposition, i.e., the mere changes of 
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standing side-by-side, such pictorial representations imply. And this then 
leads us on, only too easily, into reducing the differences between past, pre-
sent, and future merely to differences of position, with ‘past’ events being 
thought of as lying to the left of a point representing the ‘present’, with ‘fu-
ture’ events to the right. In other words, the irreversible flow of time is for-
gotten, and we forget that a successive or expressive movement has continu-
ally, in each of its successive moments, to struggle to come into existence – 
for, at each moment of its realization, it is, so to speak, a matter of navigating 
in an often unpropitious and often overwhelming sea of other possibilities, to 
all of which it must be interrelated in its own unique realization
7
.
Indeed, even more is lost or forgotten. For, not only are unique, irreversible
changes, with their own unique character, taking place, but novel changes of 
an inevitably creative, only once occurrent kind are occurring; they cannot not 
occur – this is what is implied in the very notion of the irreversible flow of 
time, i.e., in Bergson’s (1911) notion of “duration” (see note 3). 
But it is not just our anticipations of that which has not yet occurred, that 
we lose in C-C accounts of change, we also lose our sense of other people 
(and things) as having an ‘inner life’ of their own! Bergson (1911) puts it 
thus:
“Such is the contrivance of the cinematograph. And such is also that of 
our knowledge. Instead of attaching ourselves to the inner becoming of 
things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose their be-
coming artificially” (322). 
It is the “inner becoming” of indivisible things, including our surrounding 
circumstances, that is lost to us. For, as I indicated above, in C-C accounts, 
all movement is treated merely as observed differences in position (to and 
from positions that are in fact already in existence). As Bergson (1911) puts 
it, this because we try to re-compose living movement from a sequence of 
“possible immobilities” (327).
8
 And after our many years of training in our 
7  Hence the need to put the word ‘parts’ in scare quotes. While, perhaps, analytically 
separable, the ‘parts’ of a living, indivisible whole cannot be substantially separated.  
8.  To see all movement as merely observed differences in position, is to see people’s 
movements as tracing out a line or trajectory through a sequence of points. In seeing it 
thus, we have, so to speak, to “stay outside” the movement. But, as Bergson (1911) 
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everyday world of practical activities, in which so much of our talk is ori-
ented towards dealing with visibly describable and manually tangible entities 
existing in a ‘picturable’ world, it is terribly difficult for us to undo (decon-
struct) these habits of thought within ourselves. 
Gaining ongoing understandings of how to go on 
Yet, I want to claim, there is a way, and it is a way that does not entail our 
inventing a whole set of new methods de novo. Indeed, as Wittgenstein 
(1953) puts it, it is not a matter of “hunt[ing] out new facts... [or of] seek[ing] 
to learn something new.. We want to understand something that is already in 
plain view... Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer 
know when we are supposed to give an account of it” (no. 89). For example, 
if I were now to ask you (as a reader of this article) a question – say, “What 
so far seems to be the relation between Shotter’s approach here, and Berg-
son’s account of creative evolution?” – you could all make a good shot at 
giving an answer. But if I then asked: “What seemed to be involved, what 
movements of thought, so to speak, did you undertake in formulating your 
answer?” – that would be a much more difficult question to answer. About 
such a circumstance, in which we perform a complex action fairly effortlessly 
(in which in Polanyi’s (1967, 8) phrase, we show that we “know more than 
[we] can tell”), Wittgenstein (1953) suggests that we must start by “remind-
ing” ourselves of what it is that we already know – where that something of 
which we need to remind ourselves, is “obviously something of which for 
some reason it is difficult to remind oneself” (no. 89). 
It is with Wittgenstein’s (1953) voicing of these remarks in mind, that I 
want to begin to claim, that there is, “parallel to... physics, a second kind of 
knowledge,” which (to rephrase Bergson a little) does retain what physics 
has allowed to escape, that is, a second kind of knowledge that sets the cine-
puts it: “... the possibility of applying the movement to the line traversed exists only 
for an observer who, keeping outside the movement and seeing at every instant the 
possibility of a stop, tries to reconstruct the real movement with these possible immo-
bilities. The absurdity vanishes as soon as we adopt by thought the continuity of the 
real movement, a continuity of which every one of us is conscious whenever he lifts an 
arm or advances a step” (327). 
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matographical method aside and does actually follow the very flux of the real 
by installing itself within the life, within the living movement of the real 
(Bergson 1911, 343-344). In adopting it, instead of thinking about changes in 
a living, indivisible state of affairs from the outside in terms of them going 
through a sequence of separate immobile spatial configurations, we can begin 
to think in accord with their changing nature from within our living relations 
with them. For, if we can allow ourselves to be spontaneously responsive to 
the temporal unfolding of their expressive movements, then we can find that 
same unfolding movement within our own bodily-felt experience. 
But we can only find that same unfolding movement within our own bod-
ily-felt experience if we are prepared to enter into, what I will call, a living
relation with the others and othernesses around us. And action guiding sense 
of an other’s or otherness’s inner life can become available to us if we enter 
into an embodied, spontaneously responsive relation with them, a relation in 
which we are continuously responsive (in a reciprocally expressive manner) 
to their expressions, their ‘inner’ movements as they unfold in time.  
Following Bakhtin (1984), we call these two-way relations, in which our 
expressive-responsive activities are spontaneously intertwined or interwoven 
with those of the others with whom we are engaged or involved, dialogically-
structured relations – to contrast them with monological forms of relation. 
For: “Monologue is finalized and deaf to other’s response, does not expect it 
and does not acknowledge in it any decisive force” (293). Whereas: “The sin-
gle adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-
ended dialogue... To live means to participate in dialogue” to ask questions, 
to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person partici-
pates wholly and throughout his whole life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, 
spirit, with his whole body and deeds” (293).  
In the recent past (and still amongst many cognitive scientists), the main 
function of language is thought to be that of conveying our thoughts to an-
other person in the form of a “mental representation,” a picture as it were. 
And, to understand the other person’s utterance, we must ‘get the picture’! 
Hence, we study sentence forms to try to understand how they manage to 
represent their content. Bakhtin’s (1986) approach could not be more differ-
ent. Rather than seeking meaning in terms of patterns of already spoken 
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words, i.e., in what is said, he seeks it in our very words in their speaking,
i.e., in our embodied uttering of them, as we utter them. 
Above, I have characterized these two forms of understanding, of the say-
ing and of what is said, as being of a relationally-responsive (withness) or 
representational-referential (aboutness) kind, but what I want to emphasize 
here, is that crucial amongst the many other distinctions between these two 
forms of understanding, is the orientation of relationally-responsive, or with-
ness-talk, toward the future. Let me underline this with another of Bakhtin’s 
(1981) remarks: 
“The word in living conversation is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a 
future answer-word; it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures it-
self in the answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the al-
ready spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has 
not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the an-
swering word. Such is the situation of any living dialogue” (280, my em-
phasis).
This, then, as I now see it, is the major feature shift in focus in action re-
search that we need: 1) to shift our attention away from the deliberate 
thought and actions of individuals (especially those of theorists), and turn 
toward events happening spontaneously out in the world between us and the 
others and othernesses around us
9
; and further, 2) to attend to those events as 
aspects or as embedded in larger indivisible wholes within which we our-
selves are also embedded.  
Where our goal in doing this is, so to speak, re-relate ourselves intellectu-
ally to the actual events that are spontaneously influencing the shape of our 
actions, to re-relate ourselves in fact to the events that can issue us with the 
very “action guiding calls” we need if we are to ‘go on’ appropriately in re-
sponse to them (Shotter 2003b). But this can only be done if, in Bakhtin’s 
(1984) terms, we enter into dialogically-structured relations with the others 
and othernesses around us, and literally treat them as beings ‘who’ can issue 
such ‘calls’ to us. 
9  Here, we can follow Gadamer (1975, xvi; 2000, xxviii), who states: “My real concern 
was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to 
us over and above our wanting and doing.” 
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Barriers to change: local and official rationalities 
Here, then, we have a clear tension between our ordinary, everyday situations 
of decision-making in practice, characterized by struggles in the face of un-
certainty, disorder, and indeterminacy (Schön), and our representations of 
them in mainstream theory-driven research, in which we assume that when 
people act, they do so by making decisions simply in the face of the objective 
conditions confronting them, and that they progressively correct their deci-
sions and their actions accordingly as additional information turns up, i.e., 
they problem-solve. What is the source of this tension? And how might it be 
overcome? These questions are important, for clearly, the need to see our-
selves as not only rational, but as able to be called to account for the deci-
sions we make, “stands in the way” (Wittgenstein 1953, no. 305) of our see-
ing this situation “as it is.”  
And as we have seen, as participants in already ceaselessly ongoing proc-
esses, practitioners can only act in relation to the constraints and limited re-
sources locally afforded them within such processes, as well as the responses 
they ‘call for’ from them. In so doing, they often act like, say, tournament 
tennis players,
10
 doing the best they can given the exigencies of their local 
circumstances. In other words, they hardly make any self-consciously delib-
erated decisions at all! They simply act spontaneously, in terms of their em-
bodied judgment incorporated after years of experience. Thus, in going on in-
side a world that is still making them whilst they are still making it, they are 
not able to reflect on that world as a finished object: as a consequence, people 
can in fact have no reflective understanding of the local conditions that de-
10  Classically, Bartlett (1932) in discussing his idea of the ‘schema’, the “active organi-
zation of past reactions... which must always be supposed as operating in well-adapted 
organic response” (201), took making a stroke in a quick game of tennis as an exam-
ple: “How I make the stroke depends on the relating of certain new experiences, most 
of them visual, to other immediately preceding visual experiences and to my posture, 
or balance of postures, at the moment. The latter, the balance of postures, is a result of 
a whole series of earlier movements, in which the last movement before the stroke is 
played has a predominant function. When I make the stroke I do not, as matter of fact, 
produce something absolutely new, and I never merely repeat something old. The 
stroke is literally manufactured out of the living visual and postural ‘schemata’ of the 
moment and their interrelations. I may say, I may think that I reproduce exactly a se-
ries of text-book movements, but demonstrably I do not... ” (201-202, my emphasis). 
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termined their actions at all. They know what they are doing, i.e., they can 
account for it to others if challenged; they know why they are doing it, i.e., 
they have a reason for it; but what they still don’t yet know, is what their do-
ing has done – it may in the end all turn out badly. It can only be seen as hav-
ing resulted from a ‘correct decision’ after their actions have been taken. The 
fleeting joint creations, the unique, only once-occurrent events involved in 
their struggles to arrive at a satisfactory outcome, do not and cannot figure in 
any of the retrospective accounts we give others when they ask us about why 
we acted as we did. In retrospect, we can only formulate what we must have 
done in order to make our supposed ‘decision’ a correct decision. 
In our everyday affairs, as Mills (1940) and Scott and Lyman (1968) 
noted, we do not have to account to others for each and everyone of our ac-
tions. Only when others are puzzled by our actions and do not know how to 
coordinate their own actions with our’s, do they expect us to tell them of the 
reasons or motives for our actions, to account for them, to justify (or to ex-
cuse) ourselves for acting as we did. Indeed, if as a member of a particular 
society we are to have the right of acting as an autonomous individual, we 
take on the duty of knowing how to sustain that society’s norms in one’s 
conduct (Shotter 1984).
11
 Thus, it is always in relation to the ‘official’ norms 
of one’s culture that one must account to others for one’s conduct – this may 
not be very useful instructing others as to how in fact one acted in these local 
conditions in the achievement of a joint outcome along with others, but it is 
crucial in ensuring that one’s actions are related to by others, as being in ac-
cord with societal norms. However, this means that it is often the case that a 
person defines retrospectively the ‘decisions’ they supposedly made: 
whereas, in fact, the outcome occurred before the statement of the ‘decisions’ 
11  In Shotter (1984) I explore the question: “Rather than individuals, why not take par-
ticular interpersonal relationships as the units productive of action in a society: the 
speaker/listener as a unit; the teacher/pupil; mother/child; master/slave; boss/worker; 
husband/wife, etc.?,” And I suggest: “The answer, I think, lies in the fact that a soci-
ety, if it is to remain a society, must amongst other things be able to maintain a social 
order. For that to be possible, the elementary units in that order must be able to detect 
whether that order has been transgressed or not, and if so, be able to act in some way 
towards its restitution” (p.148). In other words, our adherence to an ‘official’ order 
must always take precedence over our relations to a local order. 
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accounting for it.
12
 And they need to do this to give their decision legitimacy,
i.e., they need to show how what they did fits in with the agreed overall aims 
and values of the organization in which they have a decision making role. 
In other words, there is perhaps something unrecognized at work in the 
very foundations of our forms of intellectual inquiry, something to do with 
our need to be seen as maintaining our social order. 
Garfinkel (1967) provides a now classic account of how jurors make their 
decisions “while maintaining a healthy respect for the routine features of the 
social order” (104). He highlights in his account just the tensions and ambi-
guities we have been highlighting here: that between the decision making 
methods of everyday life and acting in conformity with the “official juror 
line” (108). There is not space to go into this study in great detail, but a num-
ber of details are worthy of mention here. First, is the fact that jurors were 
themselves very aware of these tensions, and of the fact that they had retro-
spectively ‘modified’ their reasons for their judgments. But, “such selective 
‘redeliberations’, as ‘solutions’ to the ambiguities in their situations of 
‘choice’, were uneasily held and were productive of incongruity. But such 
discrepancies were privately entertained. Publically, jurors either described 
their decisions as having been arrived at in conformity with the official line 
or they preferred to withhold comment” (112). Indeed, “when, during the in-
terviews, their attention was drawn by interviewers to the discrepancies be-
tween their ideal accounts and their ‘actual practices’ jurors became anxious. 
They looked to the interviewer for assurance that the verdict nevertheless had 
been correct in the judge’s opinion” (113).
In other words, in everyday life, people face two distinct tasks in their ac-
tions: (1) the practical, prospective task of realizing an achievement, step-by-
step in relation to exacting local conditions, and (2) the ethico-political task 
of retrospectively accounting to others for the legitimacy of the final outcome 
of their actions – two tasks that need bear very little relation to each other. As 
Garfinkel (1967) puts it, after having discussed the tensions at work here: “If 
the above description is accurate, decision making in daily life would thereby 
have, as a critical feature, the decision maker’s task of justifying a course of 
12  No wonder such talk has no locally useful action guiding force to it. 
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action” (114). In other words, in our everyday activities, we are much more 
likely to be preoccupied with the problem of assigning a legitimate history to 
the outcomes of our actions than with trying to attend to the local details rele-
vant to the process of their fashioning. As Wittgenstein (1980b) remarks: 
“The facts of human history that throw light on our problem, are difficult for 
us to find out, for our talk passes them by, it is occupied with other things” 
(vol. I, no. 78). 
However, as I see it, it is precisely the function of Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
“philosophical remarks,”
13
 to give “prominence to distinctions which our or-
dinary forms of language easily make us overlook” (no. 132). They work as 
“reminders,” to alert us to pay attention to what is in fact already very famil-
iar to us within our everyday lives, but which we leave nonetheless disre-
garded – like Garfinkel’s jurors – in the background to our lives together. 
Elsewhere (Shotter 1999, 2000, 2003b), I have explored the practical sig-
nificance of Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks for action research exten-
sively, and there is not space to repeat that exploration here. But let me none-
theless suggest that this is precisely how we might best relate ourselves to a 
theorist’s utterances when they are talking of human communication and 
other human practices familiar to us: not by making use of his/her general-
ized representational meaning, i.e., what the theorist is supposedly talking 
about, what they are attempting to picture as an essential state of affairs ‘over 
there’; but by our responding to and thinking with his/her relationally-
responsive meanings in mind as guides, as “reminders,” as to how best, prac-
tically, to ‘go on’ in relation to the unique events currently occurring around 
us. For it is their utterances in the course of their speaking (when, that is, they 
are speaking of situations with which we are all familiar) that can guide us in 
acting effectively. For, if we can keep their voicing of their utterances in 
mind, like the powerful voices of our parents who instructed us in our first 
ways of acting in our community (Vygotsky 1978, 1986), they can arouse in 
us the possible action guiding advisories that can give us a sense of how to 
13  “What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings; we 
are not contributing curiosities however, but observations which no one has doubted, 
but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes” (Witt-
genstein 1953, no. 415). 
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‘go on’ in the situations of which they speak in their talk. As a result, we can 
come to view the world as much through their words as through our own eyes.
Conclusions
As we have seen above, then, ‘official’, retrospective accounts of an activity 
fail to account for the myriad situated local details to which an actor must at-
tend and respond in their struggles to creatively produce their actions in the 
first place. Such after the fact accounts, in primarily working to relocate situ-
ated actions within the general social order of everyday life, have a justifica-
tory function; they are thus somewhat beside the point as aids or guides in 
orienting practitioners toward attending to crucial details in their own local 
circumstances. In other words, what cannot be emphasized enough, is that, 
literally, there is a world of difference between first-time achievements and 
their second-time reproduction. They occur in two quite different worlds: (1) 
one in the everyday world of practice, the world of our ceaselessly flowing, 
just happening, dialogically-structured activities, in which everything occurs 
in spontaneous (non-deliberate) response to previous occurrences, whereas 
(2) the other is the modernist, Cartesian world of thoughtful individual agents 
who act deliberately by putting their intentions into action – the world in 
which many of us have been trained to think in the more ‘official’ aspects of 
our careers in formal education. 
Palshaugen (2001) notes how difficult it is for us to overcome this ten-
dency to resort to de-contextualized theory-talk: “Practitioners will over and 
over again find themselves in a situation where they in practice perform a 
‘theoretical’ kind of discourse, [while] their theoretical understanding of 
themselves as practitioners makes them blind to see this (theoretical) point” 
(210). Indeed, after groups within an enterprise had spent time on discussions 
of what problems they faced, and deciding priorities and writing down how 
each problem might be solved, and who should be responsible and what 
should be the time limits, they were very surprised when told by Palshaugen 
and his group that this very practically oriented process, although it “literally 
made a good show on paper, it was nevertheless a very ‘theoretical’ approach 
to practical problem-solving” (211). It did not orient them toward, i.e., re-
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mind them, of what in their current practices they already knew and did well. 
Thus, as Palshaugen points out, it is “an important part of our competence as 
action researchers always to be very attentive to what kind of language game 
is taking place, since what we in practice do is to act with words or intervene
with words. Thus, we have to be attentive not only to how meaning is created
by the use of words; we also have to be very attentive to how meanings may 
be changed by using words in another ways – playing language games oth-
erwise” (210). But this is not a matter of the intellect, a matter of gaining still 
more information or data, it is a matter of one’s way of being in the world, 
one’s orientation, i.e., one ways of relating oneself to the others and other-
nesses around one in one’s surroundings.
14
Again, Cunliffe (2001) provides a nice example, both of these tensions, 
and of the very effective way in which Mike, the President of a Health Man-
agement Organization in America, ignored them and made use of a more ‘po-
etic’ form of talk to portray the complexities of a whole set of interconnected 
circumstances. Cunlifee noted that in his management practice he told a lot of 
stories:
“Mike: and I do a lot of that. For me its probably the most effective way – 
in dialogue – to tell stories and use analogies and to make pictures... 
Ann: ...It can be very persuasive. ...
Mike: Yes, I think comments about it being the weakest form of argument 
is probably a very modernist view you know. Clearly, when one is 
trained/educated in the sixties/seventies, you know, right in the teeth of ra-
tionalism it sticks (laughter) but by native style I’m much more a story-
teller. Matter of fact, sometimes for presentations I’ve written fables and 
presented. ..a particular Board of Directors - I remember we were strug-
gling with an issue about strategy and where do we go and they had a very 
difficult time seeing themselves in the picture, right? and what they were 
causing to happen in the organization. So I wrote this about 6-8 page fa-
ble, and read it at the board meeting – about the Middle Ages – and lik-
14  “... it is not that before you can understand it you need to be specially trained in ab-
struse matters, but the contrast between understanding the subject and what most peo-
ple want to see. Because of this the very things which are most obvious may become 
the hardest of all to understand. What has to be overcome is a difficulty having to do 
with the will, rather than with the intellect” (Wittgenstein 1980a, 17). 
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ened our organization to a marauding band that had to support itself off 
the land at the same time it was trying to. ..and they got it – they could 
find themselves and it was very helpful. 
Ann: Did they make those connections with themselves? 
Mike: Oh yes, it wasn’t subtle (laughter) It just moved it out into a safer 
context for them to see themselves...” 
It is, perhaps, strange that a fictitious tale of a marauding band from long ago 
should provide listeners with transitional understandings and action guiding 
anticipations appropriate to their circumstances now, when talk of ‘the facts’ 
as they are now can leave people ‘cold’, i.e., unmoved, so to speak. But 
again, it needs to be born in mind that while the solving of a problem is an in-
tellectual matter, a matter of ‘figuring out’ something within one’s head, the 
kinds of struggles we face in navigating a course of action for the very first 
time, are much more a matter of one’s orientation, of finding a way of appro-
priately relating oneself to the others and othernesses in one’s surroundings. 
Here, then, as I already indicted above, we can begin to see another way 
in which what could be called ‘theory’ – but I will simply call it the voicing 
of ‘imaginative or possible theory-talk’ to ourselves or others – can influence 
us in our practical actions out in the world of our everyday, practical affairs. 
While we should not of course, as practitioners, rigorously subject ourselves 
to the words of theorists, we can sometimes find the actual words of a theo-
rist, i.e., his or her utterances, instructive; they can ‘instruct’ us, can ‘direct’ 
our attention toward this or that aspect of events occurring around us in our 
surroundings that we might not otherwise notice. Indeed, as Vygotsky (1978) 
puts it: “The child begins to perceive the world not only through his [or her] 
eyes but also through his [or her] speech” (32) – and we as adults can also 
come to see the world around us through our speech, and the speech of oth-
ers, as well.
This suggests that, when facing a uniquely difficult situation – one that 
does not present us with a well-defined problem to solve, but which requires 
a first-time struggle from us to overcome it – instead of turning away from 
such an event, and burying ourselves in thought in an attempt to explain it 
within an appropriate theoretical scheme, we should act quite differently. We 
should turn ourselves more responsively toward it, and instead of responding 
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to it in our own already established general terms, open ourselves to respond-
ing to it (or to at least aspects of it) in its own terms, i.e., as uniquely itself. 
Indeed, we can begin an extensive and intensive, i.e., nuanced and detailed, 
two-way (dialogically-structured) exploratory interaction of them with them, 
approaching them this way and that way... while being ‘moved’ to act in this
way and that in accord with the beneficial ‘reminders’ (Wittgenstein 1953, 
no. 127) or ‘pointers’ donated to us by those who have found such ‘pointers’ 
useful in their own similar such explorations. 
Specific words – of our own or of another – can, if they are uttered at a 
timely moment as a ‘reminder’ as to the possible character of our next step 
within an ongoing practical activity, be a crucial influence in the  develop-
ment and refinement of that activity. The kind of knowledgeable inquiry in-
volved here begins with our being “struck,” with our noticing of, to use Bate-
son’s (1979) phrase, a “differences that make a difference” (453). Elsewhere 
(e.g., Shotter 2000, 2001), I have discussed in particular the suitability of 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) methods for inquiries of this kind – inquiries into 
unique, only once-occurrent circumstances, in which participants within them 
are concerned to elaborate and refine. For, as he notes: “The origin and primi-
tive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more com-
plicated forms develop. Language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the 
beginning was the deed’[Goethe]” (Wittgenstein 1980a, 31). “But what is the 
word ‘primitive’ meant to say here?,” he can be heard as going on to ask 
himself: “Presumably,” he answers, “that this sort of behavior is pre-
linguistic: that a language-game is based on it, that it is the prototype of a 
way of thinking and not the result of thought” (Wittgenstein 1981, no. 541).  
In other words, it is precisely from, and only from, the noticing of such 
striking events – such differences that make a difference – that new ways of 
thinking, seeing, talking, valuing, and being, can begin and be developed. 
And indeed, Dr. Arlene Katz and I (Katz/Shotter 1996a, 1996b; Shotter/Katz 
1996; Shotter 1998), making use of Wittgenstein’s remarks (along with re-
marks from many others), have begun to develop a set of methods that we 
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call the methods of a “social poetics.”
15
 Its overall aim is the development 
within a collaborating group of appropriate ‘ways of looking’, i.e., of paying 
attention, to subtle and fleeting once-occurrent events of importance in their 
shared practice, along with an appropriate vocabulary for not only creating 
and sustaining these ‘ways of looking’, those sensitivities, but also for sus-
taining the open, dialogical forms of relationship within which such forms of 
spontaneous responsivity are possible. If they can be sustained, then, in such 
forms of co-operative, synergistic, or collaborative practices, it is possible to 
develop self-reflecting, self-critical, self-researching, and thus self-
developing practices. But to say this, is not to say anything very revolution-
ary, for such a form of ‘research’ is already a part of our everyday practices,
16
it is only revolutionary to recognize that fact. 
We have here, then, a process of inquiry in which practitioners become 
co-researchers, and researchers become co-practitioners, as each articulates 
what they have been ‘struck by’ in the unfolding process. It is a process in 
which both researchers and practitioners alike are engaged in creating with
each other an “action guiding” sense from within their lived and living ex-
perience of their shared circumstances. But such an action guiding sense can 
emerge only in the collaborative dialogical activities occurring between them; 
once it ceases, such a guiding sense ceases to exist. While it is in existence, 
practice, teaching and research can all be enfolded within each other, while 
one in-forms and creates the other in an ever evolving, generative fashion. 
Both inquiry and learning in this process thus becomes a matter of “practical 
authorship” (Shotter/Cunliffe 2003) in which managers and workers, re-
searchers and practitioners, all co-construct that which they create and learn 
together. But in such a process, it is not only the participants’ shared circum-
stances that are refined and further developed, participants also change in 
their identities  – for the changes within them are not only epistemological, 
they are also ontological (Shotter 1984). It is our spontaneous, embodied 
15  Ann Cunliffe (2001), as is apparent from my references to her work in this article, has 
developed these methods extensively also in managerial settings. 
16  Tom Andersen (pers. comm.). 
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ways of seeing and acting in the world that we change.... we change in who 
we ‘are’, how we relate ourselves to our surroundings. 
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